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THE COLLAPSE OF MONETARISM
AND THE IRRELEVANCE OF THE
NEW MONETARY CONSENSUS
 . 
Twenty-five years ago, on a brilliant winter day at Alta, I skied off the top of the Sugarloaf lift and
heard a familiar voice asking for directions. It was William F. Buckley Jr. I pulled off my hat and
went over to say hello. Buckley greeted me, then turned to a small man at his side wrapped in a
quilted green parka topped with a matching forest green stocking cap and wraparound sunglasses
in the punk style.“Of course,”Buckley said,“you know Milton Friedman.”
Last fall, when I received an invitation to deliver the 25th Annual Milton Friedman
Distinguished Lecture at Marietta College, my first act was to notify Buckley, already then quite
ill. I warned that he couldn’t publish on it or the invitation might be revoked. The e-mail came
back instantly, full of exclamation points, block caps, and misspellings.“Congratulations! What a
wonderful opportunity to REPENT!”
My other close encounter with Milton Friedman came around 18 years ago, when he invited
me to debate the themes of Free to Choose for an updated release of that 1980 television series. As
I watched it recently on the Internet,so many years later,my main impression was that this format
did not show Friedman at his best. Unlike Buckley, on television he would simplify and conde-
scend,andthislefthimvulnerabletoeasylinesof attack.WhenIsuggestedthathisprogramplainly
drew no distinctions between the Big Government of Red China and the Big Government of the
United States, he had no reply. It was true: that’s what he thought. If this were all there was to2 Policy Note, 2008 / 1
Friedman, he would not be worth talking about, and Marietta
College would not have endowed a lecture in his name.
Truly, I come to bury Milton, not to praise him. But I
would like to do so on the terrain that he favored,where he was
strong and over which he ruled for many decades. This is the
area of monetary policy,monetarism,the natural rate of unem-
ployment, and the priority of fighting inflation over fighting
unemployment. It is here that Friedman had his largest practi-
cal impact and also his greatest intellectual success. It was on
this battleground that he beat out the entire Keynesian estab-
lishment of the 1960s, stuck as they were on a stable Phillips
curve.It was here that he set the stage for the counterrevolution
that has dominated academic macroeconomics for a genera-
tion, and that—far more important—also dominated,and con-
tinues to influence, the way in which most people think about
monetary policy and the fight against inflation.
What was monetarism? Friedman famously defined it as
the proposition that“inflation is everywhere and always a mon-
etary phenomenon.” This meant that money and prices were
tied together. But more than that, Friedman believed that
money was a policy variable—a quantity that the central bank
could create or destroy at will. Create too much, and there
would be inflation. Create too little, and the economy might
collapse. There followed from this that the right amount would
generate the right result:stable prices at what Friedman came to
call the natural rate of unemployment.
The intent and effect of this line of reasoning was to defend
a core proposition about capitalism: that free and unfettered
markets are intrinsically stable. In Friedman’s gospels, govern-
mentistheloneserpentinEden,whilethetaskof policyistostay
outof theway.Justasthiswasthevulgarlessonof FreetoChoose,
so it turns out it was also the deep lesson of the larger structure
of Friedman’s thought. Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz’s A
Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960 (1963), for all
its facts and statistics, carried a simple message: the market did
not fail; the government did.
Friedman succeeded because his work was complex enough
to lend an aspect of scientific achievement to his ideas and
because those ideas played to the preconceptions of a particular
circle. As John Maynard Keynes wrote of David Ricardo in his
General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (1936):
The completeness of [his] victory is something of a
curiosity and a mystery. It must have been due to a com-
plex of suitabilities in the doctrine to the environment
into which it was projected. That it reached conclusions
quite different from what the ordinary uninstructed per-
son would expect, added, I suppose, to its intellectual
prestige. That its teaching, translated into practice, was
austere and often unpalatable, lent it virtue. That it was
adapted to carry a vast and consistent logical superstruc-
ture, gave it beauty. That it could explain much social
injustice and apparent cruelty as an inevitable incident
in the scheme of progress,and the attempt to change such
things as likely . . . to do more harm than good, com-
mended it to authority. That it afforded a measure of
justification to the free activities of the individual capi-
talist, attracted to it the support of the dominant social
force behind authority.
Friedman’s success was similar to Ricardo’s, but not in all
respects. Yes, he also explained away injustice and supported
authority. But the logical superstructure was not vast and con-
sistent. Rather, Friedman’s argument was maddeningly simple,
yet slippery. He would appeal to the short run for some effects
and to the long run for others, shifting between them as it
suited him. Once, at an American Economic Association meet-
ing in San Francisco, I encountered him at the business end of a
television camera.“Professor Friedman,” the reporter inquired,
“how will the economy do next year?”“Well,”Friedman replied,
“because of the slow money growth last year,there will be a ter-
rible recession.”“And what is your outlook for prices?”“Because
of the fast money growth over the past several years, there will
be a terrible inflation.”“Professor Friedman,” the reporter con-
tinued, “will the average American family be better off next
year,or worse off than they are today?”“There is no such thing
as the average American family. Some American families will
be better off, and some will be worse off.” As I said: he could
be difficult to pin down.And while the practice resulting from
the teachings was indeed austere and unpalatable, Friedman
actually denied this. His money growth rules promised stable
employment without inflation.Their promise was not austere,
but happy. Ricardo was Scrooge. Friedman was more like the
Pied Piper.
Friedman’s success was consolidated in the late 1970s by
facts: the strength of the monetarist regressions and the failure
of the Keynesian Phillips curve. Stagflation happened. Robert
Lucascalledthis“asclear-cutanexperimentaldiscriminationasThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 3
macroeconomics is ever likely to see.”At the same time,I played
a minor role in bringing monetarist ideas to the policy market.
My responsibility was to design the Humphrey-Hawkins hear-
ings on monetary policy from 1975 through their enactment
into law in 1978. In a practical alliance with monetarists on the
committee staff, we insisted that the Federal Reserve develop
and report targets for monetary growth a year ahead.The point
here was not to stabilize money growth as such; it was to force
the Fed to be more candid about its plans. But the process cer-
tainly lent weight to monetarism.
It was on the policy battleground, shortly after, that mone-
tarism collapsed. From 1979, the Federal Reserve formally went
overtoshort-termmonetarytargets.Theresultswereacascading
disaster: 20 percent interest rates, a 60 percent revaluation of the
dollar, 11 percent unemployment, recession, deindustrialization
throughout the Midwest, and, ultimately, the debt crisis of the
third world. In August 1982, faced with the Mexican default and
also a revolt in Congress—which I engineered from my perch at
the Joint Economic Committee—the Federal Reserve dumped
monetary targeting and never returned to it.
By the mid-1980s, the rigorous monetarism Friedman had
championed also faded from academic life. Money growth
became high and variable,but inflation never came back.Perhaps
inflation was “always and everywhere a monetary phenome-
non,” as he observed in 1963. But monetary phenomena could
happen without inflation. This vitiated the use of monetary
aggregates as an instrument of policy control. At the Bank of
England, Charles Goodhart stated his law: When you try to use
an econometric relationship for purposes of policy control, it
changes. Friedman himself conceded to the Financial Times’
Simon London in 2003:“The use of quantity of money as a tar-
get has not been a success.I’m not sure I would as of today push
it as hard as I once did.”
What remained in the aftermath was a sequence of doc-
trines.All were far more vague and imprecise than monetarism,
but they carried a similar policy message: the Fed should place
inflation control at the center of its operations; it should ignore
unemployment, unless that variable fell too low. Further, there
was a sense that instability in the financial sector should be
ignored by macroeconomic policymakers except when it could
not be ignored any longer. The first of these doctrines, the
natural rate of unemployment” or “non-accelerating inflation
rate of unemployment” (NAIRU), originated with Friedman
and Edmund Phelps in 1968 and had the fatal attraction of
incorporating expectations into a macroeconomic model for
thefirsttime.Macroeconomistsfellforitwholesale.Butitproved
laughably defective in the late 1990s, when Alan Greenspan,
bless his heart, allowed unemployment to fall below successive
NAIRU barriers—6 percent, 5.5 percent, 5 percent, 4.5 percent,
and,finally,even 4 percent.No inflation resulted.This was good
news for everyone except economists associated with the
NAIRU, who were, or ought to have been, embarrassed. Some
retreated from Friedman to Knut Wicksell: there was a brief
vogue of something called the “natural rate of interest,” an idea
unsupported by any actual research or any theory since the
demise of the gold standard.
AndthenwegotBenBernankeandtheostensibledoctrineof
“inflation targeting.”This idea—Dr. Bernankenstein’s Monster—
rests on something Marvin Goodfriend of Carnegie-Mellon
University calls the “new consensus monetary policy.” This is a
collection of ideas framed by the experience of the early 1980s
but adapted,at least on the surface,to changing conditions since
then. These are, first, that “the main monetarist message was
vindicated:monetarypolicyalone...couldreduceinflationper-
manently, at a cost to output and employment that, while sub-
stantial, was far less than in common Keynesian scenarios.”
Second, “a determined independent central bank can acquire
credibility for low inflation without an institutional mandate
from the government. . . .” And third, “a well-timed aggressive
interest-rate tightening can reduce inflation expectations and
preempt a resurgence of inflation without creating a recession.”
Let us take up each of these alleged principles in turn.
First, is the proposition that monetary policy can reduce
inflation permanently and at reasonable cost the“main mone-
tarist message”? The idea is absurd. The main monetarist mes-
sage was that the control of inflation was to be effected by the
control of money growth.We have not even attempted this for a
generation. Money growth has been allowed to do whatever it
wants. The Federal Reserve stopped paying attention and even
stopped publishing some of the statistics. Yet inflation has not
returned. The main monetarist message is plainly false. As for
the question of cost, no one ever doubted that a harsh reces-
sion could stop inflation. But, in fact, the monetarists’ reces-
sion of 1981–82 was by far the deepest in the postwar record.
It was far worse than any inflicted under Keynesian policy
regimes. In misstating this history, Goodfriend also completely
overlooks the catastrophe inflicted by the global debt crisis on
the developing world.4 Policy Note, 2008 / 1
Second, is the anti-inflation“credibility”of a“determined
independent central bank” worth anything at all? This idea is
often asserted as though it were self-evident: that workers will
restrain their wage demands because they recognize that
excessive demands will be punished by high interest rates.
There is some evidence for such a mechanism in the very spe-
cific case of postwar Germany, where the metalworkers union
implicitly bargained with the Bundesbank for a period of
some years. But in that case, the Bundesbank held a powerful,
targeted weapon: a rise in interest rates would appreciate the
deutsche mark and kill the export markets for German machin-
ery and metal products. This was a credible threat. Such a sit-
uation does not exist in the United States, and there is no evi-
dence whatever that American labor unions think at all about
monetary policy in their day-to-day work. It would not be
rational for them to do so: in a decentralized system, restraint
in one set of wages just creates an advantage for someone else.
Moreover, and still more telling, there never existed any oil
company that ever failed to raise the price of petroleum, when
it could, because it feared a rise in interest rates might afflict
someone else later on.
Third, can we safely state that a “well-timed aggressive
interest-rate tightening”can avert inflation“without creating a
recession”? That statement is surely the lynchpin of the new
monetary consensus. It was published in the Fall 2007 issue of
the Journal of Economic Perspectives—a flagship journal of the
American Economic Association—in an article by Goodfriend
titled “How the World Achieved Consensus on Monetary
Policy.” It therefore represents a statement of the highest form
of expression of economic groupthink we are ever likely to
find. Let me quote further, just so the message is clear.
Goodfriend writes:“According to this‘inflation-targeting prin-
ciple,’ monetary policy that targets inflation makes the best
contribution to the stabilization of output . . . [T]argeting
inflation thus makes actual output conform to potential out-
put.” Further:“This line of argument implies that inflation tar-
geting yields the best cyclical behavior of employment and
output that monetary policy alone can deliver. Thus, and here
is the revolutionary point delivered by the modern theoretical
consensus—even those who care mainly about the stabiliza-
tion of the real economy can support a low-inflation objective
for monetary policy . . . [M]onetary policy should [therefore]
not try to counteract fluctuations in employment and output
due to real business cycles.”
This statement was published, hilariously, around August
2007.It is the economists’equivalent of the proposition that the
road to Baghdad would be strewn with flowers. For as of that
moment, the Federal Reserve was at the crest of an “aggressive
interest-rate tightening” that had been under way since late
2004, aimed precisely at “pre-empting inflationary expecta-
tions” while “averting recession.” On July 19, 2006, Chairman
Bernanke so testified before the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs: “The recent rise in inflation is of
concern to the FOMC [Federal Open Market Committee]. . . .
The Federal Reserve must guard against the emergence of an
inflationary psychology that could impart greater persistence to
what would otherwise be a transitory increase in inflation.”On
February 14, 2007, he repeated and strengthened the message:
“The FOMC again indicated that its predominant policy con-
cern is the risk that inflation will fail to ease as expected”
(emphasis added). On July 19, 2007, this is again repeated:
“With the level of resource utilization relatively high and with
a sustained moderation in inflation pressures yet to be convinc-
ingly demonstrated, the FOMC has consistently stated that
upside risks to inflation are its predominant policy concern.”
Before the fall, Chairman Bernanke made occasional ref-
erence to developments in the financial sector. On May 23,
2006, these were actually enthusiastic. Bernanke testified:
“Technological advances have dramatically transformed the
provision of financial services in our economy. Notably,
increasingly sophisticated information technologies enable
lenders to collect and process data necessary to evaluate and
price risk much more efficiently than in the past.” And:“Market
competition among financial providers for the business of
informed consumers is, in my judgment, the best mechanism
for promoting the provision of better, lower-cost financial
products.” As for consumers, education was Bernanke’s recom-
mendation and caveat emptor was his rule: “One study that ana-
lyzed nearly 40,000 affordable mortgage loans targeted to
lower-income borrowers found that counseling before the pur-
chase of a home reduced ninety-day delinquency rates by 19
percent on average.”
On February 14, 2007, Bernanke was still optimistic:
“Despite the ongoing adjustments in the housing sector, overall
economic prospects for households remain good.”And:“Overall,
the U.S. economy seems likely to expand at a moderate pace this
year and next, with growth strengthening somewhat as the drag
from housing diminishes” (emphasis added). On March 28,The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 5
2007,hewaslesscheerfulintestimonybeforetheJointEconomic
Committee:“Delinquency rates on variable-interest-rate loans to
subprime borrowers,which account for a bit less than 10 percent
of all mortgages outstanding, have climbed sharply in recent
months.” Still: “At this juncture, however, the impact on the
broader economy and financial markets of the problems in the
subprime market seems likely to be contained.”Only on July 19,
2007, in his speech before the Senate banking committee, do we
hear that previous assessments were a bit rosy. Only then do we
hear that“in recent weeks, we have also seen increased concerns
among investors about credit risks on some other types of finan-
cial instruments.” That was three weeks before interbank lending
markets collapsed, on August 11, 2007.
What in monetarism,and what in the“new monetary con-
sensus,” led to a correct or even remotely relevant anticipation
of the extraordinary financial crisis that broke over the housing
sector, the banking system, and the world economy in August
2007 and that has continued to preoccupy central bankers ever
since? The answer is,of course,absolutely nothing.You will not
find a word about financial crises, lender-of-last-resort func-
tions, or the nationalization of banks like Britain’s Northern
Rock in papers dealing with monetary policy in the monetarist
or the “new monetary consensus” traditions. What you will
find, if you find anything at all, is a resolute, dogmatic, abso-
lutist belief that monetary policy should not—should never—
concern itself with such problems. That is partly why I say that
monetarism has collapsed. And that is why I say that the so-
called new monetary consensus is an irrelevance. Serious peo-
ple should not concern themselves with these ideas anymore.
Meanwhile, central bankers caught in the practical realities of a
collapsing financial system have had to reeducate themselves
quickly. To some degree, and to their credit, they have done so.
What they have not done is admit it.
What is the relevant economics? Plainly,as many commen-
tators have hastily rediscovered, it is the economics of John
Maynard Keynes, of John Kenneth Galbraith, and of Hyman P.
Minsky that is relevant to the current economic crisis. Let me
say a word on each.
Here is Keynes,who wrote in 1931,in his“Consequences to
the Banks of the Collapse of Money Values,”that we live
in a community which is so organized that a veil of
money is, as I have said, interposed over a wide field
between the actual asset and the wealth owner. The
ostensible proprietor of the actual asset has financed it by
borrowing money from the actual owner of wealth.
Furthermore, it is largely through the banking system
that all this has been arranged. That is to say, the banks
have, for a consideration, interposed their guarantee.
They stand between the real borrower and the real
lender. . . . It is for this reason that a decline in money
values so severe as that which we are now experiencing
threatens the solidarity of the whole financial structure.
Banks and bankers are by nature blind. They have not
seen what was coming. Some of them have even wel-
comed the fall of prices towards what, in their innocence,
they have deemed the just and “natural” and inevitable
level . . . that is to say, to the level of prices to which their
minds became accustomed in their formative years. In
the United States, some of them employ so-called “econ-
omists” who tell us even today that our troubles are due
to the fact that the prices of some commodities and some
serviceshavenotyetfallenenough....A“soundbanker,”
alas! is not one who foresees danger and avoids it, but
one who, when he is ruined, is ruined in a conventional
and orthodox way along with his fellows, so that no one
can really blame him.
In The Great Crash: 1929 (1955),my father rejects the idea,
later embraced by Friedman,that bankers and speculators were
merely reflecting the previous course of monetary policy. In
the summer of 1929,“there were no reasons for expecting dis-
aster. No one could foresee that production, prices, incomes
and all other indicators would continue to shrink for three
long and dismal years. Only after the market crash were there
plausible grounds to suppose that things might now for a long
while get a lot worse.”And,“There seems little question that in
1929, modifying a famous cliché, the economy was fundamen-
tally unsound. . . . Many things were wrong, [including] . . . the
bad distribution of income . . . the bad corporate structure . . .
the bad banking structure . . . the dubious state of the foreign
balance . . . [and] the poor state of economic intelligence.” On
the last,he also wrote,“To regard the people of any time as par-
ticularly obtuse seems vaguely improper, and it also establishes
a precedent which members of this generation might regret.
Yet it seems certain that the economists and those who offered
economic counsel in the late twenties and early thirties were
almost uniquely perverse.” On this point, John Kenneth6 Policy Note, 2008 / 1
Galbraith is now disproved. I refer you back to the “new mon-
etary consensus.”
Finally,HymanMinskytaughtthateconomicstabilityitself
breeds instability. The logic is quite simple: apparently stable
times encourage banks and others to take exceptional risks.
Soon, the internal instability they generate threatens the entire
system. Hedge finance becomes speculative, then Ponzi. The
system crumbles and must be rebuilt. Governments are not the
only source of instability. Markets, typically, are much more
unstable, much more destabilizing. This fact is clear, in history,
from the fundamental fact that market instability long predates
the growth of government in the New Deal years and after, or
even the existence of central banking.We had the crash of 1907
before, not after, we got the Federal Reserve Act.
On November 8,2002,then–Fed Governor Bernanke spoke
in Chicago to honor Milton Friedman on his 90th birthday.
Bernanke said, “As everyone here knows, in their Monetary
History, Friedman and Schwartz made the case that the eco-
nomic collapse of 1929–33 was the product of the nation’s mon-
etarymechanismgonewrong.Contradictingthereceivedwisdom
at the time that they wrote, . . . Friedman and Schwartz argued
that‘the contraction is in fact a tragic testimonial to the impor-
tance of monetary forces.’” In that era,Bernanke argued,the Fed
tightened to thwart speculation. One would argue that in
2005–07, it tightened to preempt inflation. No matter. You can
see the difficulty without my help. At the close of his speech,
Bernanke stated,“Let me end my talk by abusing slightly my sta-
tus as an official representative of the Federal Reserve. I would
like to say to Milton and Anna: Regarding the Great Depression.
You’re right, we did it. We’re very sorry. But thanks to you, we
won’t do it again.”
Less than six years later,Chairman Bernanke faces an intel-
lectual dilemma. He can stick with Milton, in which case he
must admit that the only possible cause of the present financial
crisis and evolving recession is the tightening action of the
Federal Reserve, against which, when it started back in 2004,
only two voices were heard: that of Jude Wanniski, the original
supply-sider, and my own in a joint op-ed piece no one would
publish except the Washington Times. Or he can stick with the
so-called “new monetary consensus,” which holds that the Fed
should now return to its inflation targets and pursue a much
tighter policy, and that no recession will result. If Bernanke
chooses the first, he must of course assume responsibility for
the unfolding disaster. He cannot, logically, stay with Friedman
without admitting the error of the late Greenspan years and his
own first months in office. If he chooses the second, he must
repudiate Friedman, and hope for the best. The two courses are
absolutely in conflict.
My own view is that Friedman and Schwartz were right on
the broad principle—monetary forces are powerful—but wrong
in its application. The Federal Reserve alone did not“cause”the
Great Depression.Intrinsic flaws in the financial,corporate,and
social structure,combined with bad policy both before and after
the crash, were jointly responsible for the disaster, while the
crash itself played a precipitating role. The danger, today, is that
something similar could again happen.Thus,I do not think that
rising interest rates alone caused the present collapse, and I do
not think that cutting them will alone cure it. They did so in
conjunctionwiththefailuretoregulatesubprimeloans,withthe
permissive attitude toward securitization, with the repeal of the
Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, and with the general calamity of
turning the work of government over to bankers.
But if Friedman was wrong,the“new monetary consensus”
is even more wrong. That consensus, having nothing to say
about abusive mortgage loans, speculative securitization, and
corporate fraud, is simply irrelevant to the problems faced by
monetary policy today. Its prescriptions, were they actually fol-
lowed, would lead to disaster. Its adherents—who, of course,
never had a consensus on their side to begin with—have made
themselves into figures of fun. There is, mercifully, no chance
that Bernanke will actually choose to follow their path.
And if those on both sides of Bernanke’s dilemma are
wrong, what is a beleaguered central banker to do? I have an
answer to that. Let Bernanke come over to our side. Let him
acknowledge what is obvious: the instability of capitalism, the
irresponsibility of speculators, the necessity of regulation, and
the imperative of intervention. Let him admit the intellectual
victory of John Maynard Keynes,of John Kenneth Galbraith,of
Hyman P. Minsky. Let him take those dusty tomes off the shelf
and broaden his reading. I could even send him a paper or two.Recent Levy Institute Publications
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